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Computational models in biology and biomedical science are often constructed to aid people's under-
standing of phenomena or to inform decisions with socioeconomic consequences. Model credibility is
the willingness of people to trust a model's predictions and is often difﬁcult to establish for computa-
tional biology models. A 3  3 matrix has been proposed to allow such models to be categorised with
respect to their testability and epistemic foundation in order to guide the selection of an appropriate
process of validation to supply evidence to establish credibility. Three approaches to validation are
identiﬁed that can be deployed depending on whether a model is deemed untestable, testable or lies
somewhere in between. In the latter two cases, the validation process involves the quantiﬁcation of
uncertainty which is a key output. The issues arising due to the complexity and inherent variability of
biological systems are discussed and the creation of ‘digital twins’ proposed as a means to alleviate the
issues and provide a more robust, transparent and traceable route to model credibility and acceptance.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
2. Credibility matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
3. Model validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
4. Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 001. Introduction
Whenever a model is developed, a primary concern of the
modeller is the credibility of their model. Credibility has been
described by Schruben (Schruben, 1980) as reﬂecting 'the willing-
ness of persons to base decisions on information obtained from the
model'. So, the issue becomes a matter of providing sufﬁcient evi-
dence of the model's ﬁtness for purpose to induce this willingness..A. Patterson).
n, E.A., Whelan, M.P., A fram
y (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10Rudner (1953) postulated that our judgement on the strength of the
evidence depends on the importance or consequences of making a
mistake, which implies that modellers need to consider the
intended uses of their model when identifying the evidence
required to underpin credibility.
Often in biology, as in other areas of pure science, the primary
value of computational models is heuristic (Oreskes et al., 1994).
They are representations of reality that are valuable for under-
standing and guiding further research or study. In these circum-
stances, when the role of the model is not associated with decision-
making, its absolute accuracy is not the essential issue. Rather, it is
more appropriate to consider computational models as theework to establish credibility of computational models in biology,
.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.08.007
Fig. 1. a schematic diagram illustrating the relationship between testable and un-
testable models that are either based on known biology (i.e. principled) or unknown
biology (i.e. unprincipled) together with the approaches to performing a validation and
the resultant level of credibility that can be established indicated by the greyscale.
Testable models are those for which it is possible to acquire measured data from real-
world experiments, while untestable models are those for which it is not possible to
make measurements corresponding to the model's predictions. Epistemic validation is
based on the epistemic values of the model including simplicity, consistency and
explanatory power; rational-empirical validation involves a series of three ‘tests’ using
rationalism, empiricism and demonstration of predictive accuracy; while quantitative
validation employs the rigorous methods described in engineering standards.
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periments are performed for the purpose of exploring hypotheses
and revealing features of behaviour for which only sparse or no
observational data is available (Winsburg, 2010). If the revealing of
features is a sufﬁcient outcome, then an adequate process of model
validation to underpin credibility could be to simply ensure that the
model is useful and functional in providing relevant insights. This
approach has been employed, for example, in materials science and
termed 'validation of phenomena' (Patterson, 2015).
Biology overlaps with engineering when it is used to create
man-made components and products or when engineered prod-
ucts interact with human biology, such as in pharmacology and
toxicology. In these circumstances, when models are used, it would
be appropriate to adopt the level of rigour employed routinely by
the engineering sector to demonstrate their credibility. Engineers
use computational models to evaluate and reﬁne the performance,
reliability and safety of designs of engineered products. Hence for
these models, which might be termed predictive rather than heu-
ristic, the consequence of making a mistake will be typically
measured in socioeconomic costs, often signiﬁcant, such as loss of
life or injury. This implies the need for strong evidence that the
computational model closely reﬂects reality, and leads to the
deﬁnition of validation as 'determining the degree to which a
model is an accurate representation of the real world from the
perspective of its intended uses' (ASME V&V 10-2006, 2006). The
engineering community has developed a series of quantitative
validation procedures, (e.g. in solid mechanics (Sebastian et al.,
2013)), that allow the evidence to be assembled in a framework
that is recognised by modellers and end-users, (e.g. for solid me-
chanics models (CWA 16799, 2014)), and supports the establish-
ment of credibility and conﬁdence.
In in silico biology, when computational models are used to
reveal features of behaviour, even the 'validation of phenomena'
can be challenging in the absence of reliable data from the real-
world, which of course is often the reason for wanting to use a
model in the ﬁrst place. Some computational models of biological
systems would appear to be untestable due to their complexity and
the difﬁculty in acquiring reliable data from the biological system. It
is tempting at this point, to trust to the judgment of the modeller
and accept that the simulationwill provide interesting information.
However, Hughes (1999) has said that in silico experiments reveal
information about three types of world: the actual world, possible
worlds and impossible worlds; and that it is not possible to know
which has been revealedwithout taking an extra step, such as some
form of validation. So, it would be inappropriate to abandon some
effort to test the reliability of computational biology models. Thus,
our aim is to develop a framework for establishing the credibility of
computational biology models that are classiﬁed according to our
ability to test them and identify their epistemological foundations,
to support the work of both modellers and those making decisions
based on results from models.
2. Credibility matrix
Untestable models are employed in physics and, to a lesser
extent, engineering. Tegmark has drawn an epistemological
boundary between physics and metaphysics that is deﬁned by
whether or not a theory is experimentally testable (Tegmark, 2014).
While for engineeringmodels, Patterson (Patterson, 2015) has gone
further and constructed a 2  2 diagram that identiﬁes the
appropriate approach to establishing the credibility of testable and
untestable or meta models based onwhether they are principled or
unprincipled, i.e. whether the underlying physics is known or un-
known. In Fig. 1, we have developed this approach for use in
computational biology and in silico medicine.Please cite this article in press as: Patterson, E.A., Whelan, M.P., A fram
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10Sober (Sober, 1993) has stated that there are no exceptionless
laws in biology. Notwithstanding that some would point to the ﬁrst
law of biology being ‘the tendency for diversity and complexity to
increase in evolutionary systems’ (McShea and Brandon, 2010), it is
clear that it is difﬁcult to identify universally accepted biological
laws. Thus, the use of principled and unprincipled on the horizontal
axis is potentially problematic when referring to biology. Instead, in
Fig. 1 the more general terms 'known biology' and 'unknown
biology' have been used. The allocation of a model between these
two categories should be made based on whether or not its
knowledge base is founded on one of the three types of scientiﬁc
reasoning (Osimani and Mignini, 2015), namely (i) inductive
reasoning from empirical data to a theory, (ii) hypothesis falsiﬁ-
cation through modus tollens, or (iii) explanatory reasoning. These
modes of reasoning are generic, and in biology it would be
appropriate to embrace Hill's criteria for causation (Villeneuve
et al., 2014). Computational biology models are unlikely to be as
readily categorised as implied above, so it is appropriate to include
a transition zone between models based on known biology and
those based on unknown biology, i.e. between principled and un-
principled. For example, a model of a biological system is usually
constructed by combining models of its sub-systems, each perhaps
reﬂecting different scales of biological organisation, and each based
on varying degrees of phenomenological understanding. Such
models would be located in this transition zone (i.e. the middle
column in Fig. 1) especially when the linkages between the sub-
systems are not understood.
In computational biology, at the boundary between testable and
untestable models in Fig. 1, there will be another transition zone
that originates from the difﬁculties in making quantitative obser-
vations of real-world biology, which leads to sparse or incomplete
data. This is in part due to our inability to control the real-world, as
observed by Viceconti (Viceconti, 2015).
The credibility of models that fall into the bottom left corner in
Fig. 1 can be established using the type of quantitative validation
procedures that are being codiﬁed by the engineering communityework to establish credibility of computational models in biology,
.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.08.007
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the underlying principles of the model are understood has the
consequence that the gathering of observational data can be se-
lective and efﬁcient. The bottom right corner is a little more difﬁcult
because the principles are unknown. However, when sufﬁcient
observational data is available that covers the full parameter space
and applicability domain of the model, then it is possible to
perform a quantitative validation without demonstrating the
legitimacy of assumptions underlying the model. This is reminis-
cent of the approach taken by Milton Friedmann, the economist,
who proposed that the veracity of a model depends not on its as-
sumptions but on its ability to predict the behaviour of the
dependent variables treated by the model (Friedmann, 1953).
In the context of climate modelling, where sparse observational
data is available in the near-term time domain and reliable detailed
predictions in the far-term time domain are required, Biddle and
Winsberg (2010) have proposed that models with epistemic
properties are more likely to be appropriate than others. Epistemic
values include simplicity, explanatory power, and internal and
external consistency. This validation approach is viable for the top
left corner in Fig.1, where amodel is principled, but becomes less so
as one ventures into the top right corner. Here, unprincipled and
untestablemodels do not lend themselves to validation and possess
radical uncertainty or unforeseeable outcomes (Roth, 2009) that
renders them inappropriate for supporting decisions that have
socioeconomic consequences. In summary, the degree of belief in a
model tends to increase with the body of evidence available to
support it (Audi, 2011) based, in this context, on varying degrees of
phenomenological understanding and observational data. Thus the
level of credibility for models, which can be established through
validation, tends to decrease radially outwards from the bottom left
corner of Fig. 1 (as indicated by the greyscale), i.e. it is easier to
establish credibility for models that are principled and testable
than for those that are unprincipled and untestable.
3. Model validation
Validation is the process of establishing the degree to which a
model is an accurate representation of the real-world for its
intended purpose. A model does not pass or fail a validation pro-
cess, because no decision is involved. Instead, a validation process
provides information that allows others to make a decision on the
acceptability or trustworthiness of the predictions from amodel. As
discussed earlier, a predictive model whose outputs will inform
decisions with consequences requires a rigorous demonstration of
its ﬁtness for purpose, often involving a ‘normative-based’ valida-
tion that includes the quantiﬁcation of model uncertainty. On the
other hand, an informative model whose purpose is heuristic
carries a lower burden of demonstration of its credibility. In gen-
eral, informative models lie in the top row in Fig. 1, and when
modelling in support of decision-making with socioeconomic
consequences, it is advisable to avoid models that fall near the top
right corner. However, it seems entirely appropriate for computa-
tional biologists to deploy such models in scientiﬁc endeavor and
the pursuit of a greater understanding of biological systems. The
use of epistemic properties to establish credibility for models in the
top row in Fig. 1 is perhaps the only viable approach to validation
and might be termed ‘epistemic validation’. Hence, a more detailed
consideration here of the epistemic properties of a biological model
in terms of simplicity, explanatory power and consistency is
worthwhile and appropriate.
Simplicity appears to be an intuitively appropriate property of a
reliable model based on Occam's razor and likely to support a
willingness in others to trust a model, i.e. to support credibility.
Wimsatt (1981) has proposed that a false assumption in a modelPlease cite this article in press as: Patterson, E.A., Whelan, M.P., A fram
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can be shown that replacing it with a more realistic one does not
change the answer provided by the model to the question of in-
terest. This allows models to be simpliﬁed and perhaps justiﬁes the
epistemic value of simplicity. The property of explanatory power
echoes the Friedmann approach described above, in the sense it
implies that if a model predicts a phenomenon then it is more likely
to be correct than if it does not; but, this is not particularly helpful
since a model that does not have explanatory power is not useful
andwould be rejected anyway. The requirement for consistency is a
better test and ideally should be applied both internally and
externally. External consistency with observations is not viable for
untestable models, due to the absence of data, but consistency with
other models is a feasible test and is the ﬁrst of a series of strategies
which Franklin (Franklin, 1986) has identiﬁed that experimentalists
use to ascertain the reliability of data from experiments. It is sug-
gested that it is good practice to adopt his remaining strategies for
in silico experiments, which are to demonstrate that (a) the
experiment produces an already known result; (b) when perturbed
the experiment produces the expected result; (c) the experiment is
able to detect artifacts known to exist; (d) effects disappear when
expected to do so and (e) when all plausible sources of error are
eliminated the remaining observations must be real.
The nature of untestable and unprincipled models renders the
application of some of Franklin's strategies problematic due to the
lack of physical observations and makes it necessary to distinguish
between cases in which there is no quantitative data, i.e. mea-
surement is impossible, and no observation of any type is feasible,
in other words even qualitative data cannot be acquired. In these
latter conditions,Winsberg (Winsburg, 2010) has proposed that the
theoretical ancestry of a simulation carries a heavy burden in
providing credibility. Laying out the theory is the ﬁrst stage in
modelling, a process that Hacking terms 'speculation', and then the
model needs to be built, which Hacking calls 'calculation' (Hacking,
1983). Model building usually involves discretization of the prob-
lem, possibly in many domains including time and space, in order
to make it tractable with the computing resources available. Dis-
cretization converts what might be an analytical, or at least
mathematically, continuous theory into an approximate estimation
in a computational model and hence can be a major source of error.
In addition, in complex multi-scale models, several layers of dis-
cretization may be necessary to describe the structure and function
of the complete system. The connections between these discrete
sub-models are often cobbled-together ﬁctions or ‘kluge’ that add
substantially to the uncertainty in the predictions. In these cir-
cumstances, model credibility must come not only from the
'ancestry' of the theory, which will not be available for unprincipled
models, but also from the established credentials of the model-
building techniques, leading to what are known as ‘self-vindi-
cating’ models (Winsberg, 2003). The process of demonstrating
that a model has epistemic properties will not constitute a quan-
titative validation because the degree to which the model repre-
sents the real world cannot be quantiﬁed in this process. Instead,
qualitative evidence is accumulated and can be used to establish
credibility for the model as a heuristic tool for exploring and
extending our understanding of phenomena.
The quantitative approaches to validation associated with
principled testable models can be applied to models across the
bottom of the diagram in Fig. 1. The reliability of the predictions
from unprincipled models can be demonstrated in the same
manner as for principled ones, that is, through quantitative com-
parisons of comprehensive datasets. The comparative analysis of
measured and predicted datasets will allow the degree towhich the
model represents reality for its intended uses to be established in
terms of probability distributions. In this region of the matrix theework to establish credibility of computational models in biology,
.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.08.007
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more complicated due to variability and complexity of biological
systems. These approaches are described in detail elsewhere, for
instance by Roy and Oberkampf (Roy and Oberkampf, 2011), and so
are not discussed further here. Overall, the level of credibility of a
model will increase with the body of evidence supporting it (Audi,
2011), and even though a lack of principled-knowledge can be
compensated to some extent with more observational data, and
vice versa, the most credible models will be underpinned by an
optimal balance of both principled knowledge and observational
data.
The validation of models falling in the zone between the testable
and untestable models is more problematic and more likely to be
required by computational biologists because in many cases the
quantity of measured data will be small or sparse. In circumstances
in which we have incomplete information about the real-world
behaviour of a system, Naylor et al. (Naylor et al., 1967) proposed
a three-step approach based on rationalism, empiricism and
demonstration of predictive accuracy. Rationalism is the belief that
a model is simply a system of logical deductions from a series of
synthetic premises of unquestionable truth, where a synthetic
premise is a proposition based on observation rather than analysis.
So the ﬁrst step involves identifying the relevant deductions and
premises, which is equivalent to identifying whether or not the
model lies on the principled or unprincipled side of the matrix in
Fig. 1. In this context, Viceconti has provided a useful taxonomy of
predictive models (Viceconti, 2011). Empiricism refutes any pos-
tulates or assumptions that cannot be independently conﬁrmed,
hence step two involves the testing of individual assumptions used
in constructing the model. These assumptions should be tested
against real-world observations in order to establish their validity.
The third step is to conﬁrm the predictive ability of the model by
making quantitative comparisons to the available data from the
real-world regardless of whether the ﬁrst and second step gave
completely positive outcomes, i.e. following the approach champ-
ioned by Friedmann. We would recommend that at each step, or as
a fourth step, the uncertainties associated with the model are
identiﬁed and characterised. If this is performed as a fourth step
then the six sources of model uncertainty identiﬁed by Roy and
Oberkampf (Roy and Oberkampf, 2011) form a suitable framework
for estimating total uncertainty.
4. Acceptance
The credibility of a model is in the gift of the decision-maker and
not the modeller. This is because credibility is about the willingness
of others to make decisions based on the outcome from the model,
i.e. its predictions. The degree of belief in a model increases with
the body of evidence supporting its claim for being an acceptable
representation of reality for the purposes of the decision. The
modeller is rarely the decision-maker and indeed Jeffrey (Jeffrey,
1956) argued that the scientist's proper role is to provide ratio-
nale agents in society with the probabilities related to a hypothesis,
and the rationale agents, or decision-makers, then make a decision.
This is an approach that Biddle and Winsberg (2010) have applied
to climate change modelling and it seems appropriate to use in the
context of in silico biology and medicine, where in the latter case
regulators, clinicians and patients are likely to be the rationale
agents.
It is relevant to consider the process by which a decision-maker
should review the information provided by the modeller since this
should inﬂuence the behaviour of the modeller. In some areas of
engineering and applied science a simulation review is conducted
and Kaizer et al. (Kaizer et al., 2015) have described the process in
the nuclear industry, which is sufﬁciently generic to be applied inPlease cite this article in press as: Patterson, E.A., Whelan, M.P., A fram
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determine (a) the trustworthiness of the results of the simulation
and (b) the level of trustworthiness required for the intended
purpose. Then, based on these two pieces of information, a decision
is made onwhether to trust the speciﬁc simulation for the intended
purpose. Clearly this process becomes easier as the body of evi-
dence grows so that reviews of simulations based on predictive
models that lie in the bottom left corner of Fig. 1 are more likely to
lead to positive outcomes than for models in other areas of the
ﬁgure.
The above discussion implies that it is unlikely, for example, that
an initial and novel computational biology model of a virtual tissue
would be accepted by a regulator making decisions on licensing a
pharmaceutical. It is probable that the model would be unprinci-
pled because we do not understand all of the mechanisms involved
in the underlying pathways and processes, and it might also be
untestable in the real-world, i.e. in humans. Such a model would
likely lie towards the top right corner in Fig. 1 with a very low
prospect of achieving credibility and acceptance, though it might
enhance our understanding of important phenomena. It is likely
that this exemplar model would consist of a number of sub-
elements or sub-models in order to represent the complexity of
the process and we can exploit this network of sub-elements to
create a knowledge base that improves the prospect of establishing
credibility and acceptance. Recently, Villeneuve et al. (2014) have
described strategies for developing Adverse Outcome Pathways
(AOPs) that can be considered as models of toxicological processes.
AOPs are built from knowledge about biologically plausible, and
empirically supported, links between a molecular-level perturba-
tion of a biological system and an adverse outcome at an organ or
organism level. AOPs consist of a molecular-initiating event (MIE)
and an adverse outcome connected by a series of key events (KE)
and key event relationships (KER). Key events are measurements of
change in a biological state that are indicative of progress towards
the adverse outcome, while key event relationships are causal as-
sociations between the key events. Putative AOPs usually start out
towards the top right corner in Fig. 1, but move to the bottom right
corner as the identiﬁcation of the key events proceeds because, by
deﬁnition, the key events have to be measurable. The identiﬁcation
of the key event relationships that are biologically plausible and
supported by empirical data transfers the AOP to the bottom left
corner because the model(s) embedded in an AOP can be consid-
ered principled, i.e. the biology is known. Hence, the process of
developing an AOP or a similar knowledge-based model, such as a
disease AOP (Langley et al., 2015) or therapeutic outcome pathway,
offers an approach with the potential to substantially increase the
prospects of establishing credibility. Of course, translations across
the diagram towards the bottom left corner in Fig. 1 bring with
them an implied requirement to adjust the validation approach
appropriately.
5. Discussion
Most biological systems exhibit behaviour that is characterised
by feedback loops and non-linearity. The solutions of the resultant
non-linear equations describing such systems are not single values
but series of values that are often represented in state (or phase)
space as patterns or portraits, known as attractors. There are three
classes of attractor: point, periodic and strange. Point attractors
describe systems in stable equilibrium and periodic attractors those
oscillating in a periodic equilibrium. Strange attractors correspond
to systems exhibiting chaotic behaviour and may have bifurcation
points in the phase portrait at which system behaviour changes and
a new order is established (Capri and Luisi, 2014). Examples of the
use of non-linear systems models (e.g. (Lachowicz, 2011; Gherguework to establish credibility of computational models in biology,
.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.08.007
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biology and the use of phase portraits or similar approaches (e.g.
Gross et al. (2011)) to represent system behaviour is rare. However,
the implications for validation protocols are serious because the
model is no longer deterministic but will produce a set of solutions
described by the phase portrait and it is likely that our real-world
measurements will only represent a tiny fraction of the possible
locations in the phase portrait. Indeed, without a precise knowl-
edge of the initial starting conditions wewill not even know where
to look in the phase portrait. As a consequence, the accuracy of a
non-linear dynamics model is likely to be underestimated and the
apparent variability in the experimental data cause it to be dis-
carded or down-graded when actually it simply represents
different locations in state space. O'Leary et al. (2015) have identi-
ﬁed the need to develop alternative strategies for ﬁtting data ac-
counting for dynamic state estimation but we need to go a step
further and develop data comparison methods with similar
capabilities.
Biological systems are complex in the sense that they exhibit
non-trivial emergence and self-organising behaviours (Mitchell,
2009). In 1925 C.D. Broad used the term 'emergent property' to
describe behaviour that emerges at a certain level of complexity but
does not exist at lower levels (Broad, 1925). This has implications in
hierarchical and multi-scale modelling and DeLanda (2011) has
discussed how emergent properties allow simulations to decom-
pose reality and replicate phenomena at one scalewithout the need
for high ﬁdelity representation at all scales. This implies that when
we are interested in the behaviour of a complex system we do not
need to model all of its components nor do we need to validate the
performance of the models of the sub-systems. It is clear that
cognizance of emergent behaviour is always necessary to produce a
reliable model. However, when high ﬁdelity modelling is not un-
dertaken at all scales it might mask, intentionally or otherwise, a
lack of knowledge of the relevant biology which would place the
model in the right half of Fig. 1 with the associated credibility
issues.
The underlying issue is that the traditional approach to
modelling complex systems is based on Cartesian reductionism,
which is the concept that everything about a complex system can
be understood by reducing it to the smallest constituent part. In the
context of natural systems, a move away from reductionism to-
wards a systems view has been championed by Capri and Luisi who
have stated that a reductionist approach has revealed much about
the subunits within the cell but nothing about the balancing of their
independentmetabolic pathways and cycles (Capri and Luisi, 2014).
This shift away from a reductionist approach presents new chal-
lenges to establishing model credibility because in a reductionist
approach the emphasis is usually on measuring and quantifying
behaviour, whereas with a systems view the focus is on the map-
ping of relationships and behavioural patterns. The complexity of
biological systems implies that an exact knowledge of relationship
and patterns will usually not be attainable and wemust be satisﬁed
with an approximate knowledge. In other words, we cannot be
certain about the behaviour of the system of interest. There will
always be a degree of uncertainty or a probability that the system
will behave in a particular way. Experiments in vivo, in vitro and in
silico can increase our understanding and Bayesian techniques can
be used to update our probabilistic knowledge of a system's
behaviour as new information becomes available (Osimani and
Mignini, 2015). Bayesian networks (e.g. Needham et al. (2007))
and computation (e.g. Liepe et al. (2014); Gasche, Mahevas,
Marchal) have found applications in computational biology and a
recent review (Price et al., 2014) by a working group of the Drug
Information Association supported the use of Bayesian methods for
the design and analysis of safety trials for new pharmaceutics.Please cite this article in press as: Patterson, E.A., Whelan, M.P., A fram
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handle these issues.
Recently, Carusi (2014) has discussed the impact of inherent
variability in biological systems on validation which she identiﬁes
as arising at three levels: sub-cellular, cellular variability between
collocated cells of the same type and cellular variability between
non-collocated cells of the same type. At a more fundamental level,
the randomness of chemical reactions based on chance collisions of
molecules ensures that some randomness or variability will always
be present. This generates an irreducible or aleatory uncertainty
that can be characterised by a probability density distribution,
whereas our lack of knowledge about the system generates an
epistemic uncertainty that can be reduced by acquiring more
knowledge. The implication for model validation and credibility is
that these uncertainties need to be identiﬁed and characterised,
and then utilised in decision-making, which emphasises the
importance of reporting uncertainties as a key output of the vali-
dation process.
Viceconti et al. (2005) discussed the veriﬁcation and validation
of ﬁnite element models intended to be used to extract clinically
relevant data. They proposed that veriﬁcation, i.e. ensuring that the
mathematics of the model is implemented correctly, was the re-
sponsibility of individual scientists while validation involves the
whole community. In the engineering community, veriﬁcation is
performed by the commercial suppliers of the software, usually
using internationally accepted benchmarks and this would seem to
be an appropriate approach to adopt in computational biology.
However, a community-owned approach to validation, including
the sharing of collections of models and validation-quality data
would lead to more robust validations, particular when diverse
data sets are available. In turn, such validation processes would
possess a high degree of transparency and traceability, and hence
would contribute considerably to credibility and acceptance of
models. Going further, such validated models combined with their
associated real-world datasets could evolve to become digital twins
of biological systems particular to speciﬁc sub-populations or even
individuals. The concept of digital twins probably originated in the
aerospace industry (Glaessgen and Stargel, 2012) and its deploy-
ment in the civil nuclear industry has been proposed recently
(Patterson et al., 2016). In these industry sectors, the advantages of
digital twins have been identiﬁed as shortening development
times, reducing costs and improving safety, reliability and usability.
It is reasonable to expect similar advantages to accrue in biomedical
science and engineering.
It is important to appreciate validation is a process that, in some
ways, is never completed. This is because the outcome of the vali-
dation process is a statement about the degree to which a model is
an accurate representation of the real-world for the intended
purposes of the model, and the level of representation can nearly
always be improved. The outcome from a quantitative validation
process includes a statement about the uncertainties associated
with the predicted and measured data used in the process, which
together allow the accuracy of the representation to be expressed in
terms of probabilities. Subsequently, the process of establishing
credibility in a model is two-way exchange between the decision-
maker, or end-user, and the modeller, which can be described as
a process of social epistemology, i.e. arriving at a collective under-
standing of the value of the model. When the predictions of the
model are to be used to support decisions with socioeconomic
consequences then it is likely that a high level of conﬁdence and
low levels of uncertainty will be demanded by the decision-maker.
However, increases in conﬁdence levels and reductions in uncer-
tainty will usually have resource implications in terms of updating
and reﬁnement of the model and, or the acquisition of better
quality data from the real-world. Hence a cost-beneﬁt analysis willework to establish credibility of computational models in biology,
.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.08.007
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acquired from the real-world but instead from an experiment that
is itself a representation of reality and so consideration needs to
given to the extent to which the experiment is an accurate repre-
sentation of the real-world for the intended purposes of the model.
Here, it is important that the experiments are designed in collab-
oration with the modeller in another process of social episte-
mology, i.e. a two-way exchange leading to a shared understanding
of the model and reality. Some people have described this process
as a cycle, or as part of model-simulation-experiment system
(Carusi et al., 2012), which is sometimes portrayed as circular. We
would suggest that it is more akin to cycles of oscillation as shown
schematically in Fig. 2. The interaction between the design of the
model and experiment starts with the identiﬁcation of initial
conceptual ideas leading to an initial or ﬁrst model that can be used
to design an appropriate experiment and leads to the acquisition of
measured data, i.e. experience of reality. This data can be used to
evaluate the performance of the model, including its validation,
which permits the interpretation of the predicted data that can be
used to revise the conceptual ideas. The cycle is repeated so that
progress is made towards both an increased conceptual under-
standing and knowledge of reality. This parallel progress towards
conceptual understanding and knowledge of reality can be the
outcome of both heuristic and predictive modelling. This social
epistemological approach can lead to concerns about so-called
'double-counting' of measured data when it is used for both cali-
bration or updating of models and in the validation process,
particularly when data is limited as for models lying in the middle
row of Fig. 1. Carusi and her co-workers (Carusi, 2014; Carusi et al.,
2012) avoid this issue by performing validation using experimental
datasets that are independent of those used in the construction of
the model. However, Steele and Werndl, (2013, 2016) have argued
that these practices are justiﬁablewithin a Bayesian framework and
with appropriate reference to the logic of conﬁrmation or valida-
tion, as we have discussed.Fig. 2. a schematic representation of a social epistemological approach to advancing
conceptual understanding and knowledge of reality through the integrated use of
modelling and experiments. Conceptual understanding and knowledge of reality are
developed in parallel through using conceptual understanding to create ideas that
form the basis of models which inform experiment design and are validated using
observations and measurements of reality that also enhance our knowledge of reality.
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Model credibility is about the willingness of people to make
decisions based on the predictions from the model. It is the re-
sponsibility of the modeller to provide evidence of the trustwor-
thiness of the model which should include the results of a
validation process. The decision-maker should review both the
evidence provided in support of the model's trustworthiness and
the level of trustworthiness required for the intended purpose, and
then using these two pieces of information, make a decision on the
acceptability of the predictions.
In computational biology and biomedicine these processes are
often not straightforward because of the difﬁculties associatedwith
acquiring experimental data to support the validation process and
establishing the veracity of the premises on which the models are
constructed. A framework based on a 3  3 matrix has been pre-
sented that allows models to be categorised according to their
testability and basis in known biology, or epistemic foundations.
The ease with which credibility can be established increases with
both testability and the strength of the epistemic foundations.
Strategies for demonstrating the ﬁtness for purpose of amodel have
been proposed according to whether the available data from reality
is potentially unlimited, sparse or unobtainable. These strategies
have been termed: quantitative, rationale-empirical and epistemic
respectively and provide decreasing levels of quantitative infor-
mation about the probability that the model is an accurate repre-
sentation of reality for its intended purpose or application.
In order to increase the prospects for establishing credibility and
acceptance of a model, it is recommended that modellers should
adopt strategies to increase the testability and strengthen its
epistemic foundation. It has been illustrated how the use of a
knowledge driven approach to model building, such as the Adverse
Outcome Pathway (AOP) can support this strategy by assisting in
translating a model of a complex system from being untestable and
unprincipled, with a low prospect of establishing credibility or
being accepted, into a set of testable, principledmodels with a good
prospects for credibility and acceptance.
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